

# **Cyber Hospitality in Safety: Protecting Shared Broadband against Contagion**

Saturday, April 2, 2011

Sunday, April 3, 2011

Trenton Computer Festival  
College of New Jersey  
Ewing, New Jersey

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**If it makes a sound, SET IT ON SILENT  
(e.g., mobiles, pagers, PDA, smartphone)**

## Internet Access has become expected

- by parents
- by children
- by guests of both


## The connected home –

- 7 x 24 x 366
- fixed machines
- resident mobile devices
- visitor devices

## Privacy –

- Do you want your kids (and their friends) looking at your bank accounts?

## Canonical Firewall Architecture



## The Real Issue – TRUST

- the word TRUST means different things in different contexts
- the word TRUST means different things to different communities
- In human relationships, TRUST is often used in an absolute sense
- In legal contexts, TRUST is a far different concept
- Unsurprisingly, people can often agree on wording easier than the concept

All of engineering & structural design  
is about safety factors.

The art of ensuring safety in the face of  
error, uncertainty, and imperfection.

In God we trust –  
All others we polygraph.

– Tom Clancy

## Technical TRUST – What does it mean?

- Liability exposure
- Need to know
- Things may not work as planned
- When building houses, carpenters:
  - toe-nail
  - cross-brace
  - hurricane straps


## Goal – Seamless Technical TRUST –

- If you don't breach the barrier, it isn't really there. Is it?
- Insufficient walls create catastrophic failures – the “Titanic/Comet Syndrome”

## Original Internet – Total TRUST

- No safeguards
- No integrity checks
- No compartmentalization
- Total Net Crash – IMP caused (SEN, 1/1981)
- Trusting server processes (e.g., sendmail)


## Traditional Simplistic Firewall Architecture



## Analyze the Threats

- Internal information control (“Need to know”)
- Curiosity (e.g., celebrity tax returns)
- Insider fraud
- “Loose lips sink ships”
- Criminal
- Visitor-borne contagion

## Who should see what? Inside less trusted than DMZ



## “Inside” Community is more Diverse

- Parents
- Children
- Tradespeople
- Neighbors
- Friends
- Relatives

## Questions?

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### Session Notes & Materials:

<http://www.rlgsc.com/trentoncomputerfestival/2011/index.html>